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Abstract—NTRU is the leading alternative to ECC and RSA
in the post-quantum era. However, it has a probability of
decryption failure of 2−k (with k being the security level)
according to Philip S. Hirschhorn, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Nick
Howgrave-Graham and William Whyte, 2009. This probability
was provided for parameters selected using an algorithm which
provides security against lattice reduction and MITM attacks,
with particular emphasis on parameter size and coefficients of
the private key. The recommendations for selection of polyno-
mials in NTRU described by Hoffstein, Jeff Howgrave-Graham,
Nick Pipher, Jill Whyte and William in 2010 prescribed that for
polynomial f of binary form. In this paper, we re-evaluate the
prescribed parameter selection criteria by rigorous testing of
different polynomial combinations of f , g, m and ϕ as well as
q for varied security levels. The testing experimentally verifies
the influential parameters for NTRU operation whose results
are used to propose an extended correlated parameter selection
criteria for the private key, which ensures that a randomly
selected polynomial f is invertible and that an accurate selection
of the minimum size of q required for successful decryption is
made.
Index Terms—Cryptography, NTRU, decryption failure, lat-
tices, private key, binary polynomials.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lattice-based cryptosystems are resistant to quantum algo-
rithm attacks [1], [2] thus providing assurance of security in
the post-quantum era. The security of information, in terms
of integrity and authenticity, is ensured through the use of
encryption [3] which involves the application of a series of
computations(employing confusion and diffusion attributes
[4]) so as to encrypt the data [5] thereby safeguarding it.
One such algorithm is the NTRU (Nth Degree Truncated
Polynomial Ring) cryptosystem. It is an asymmetric key
cryptosystem whose security is based on the difficulty in
solving the approximate closest vector problem [6]. It has
two varieties: NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign. It is mostly
implemented in the financial services industry and has been
standardized by IEEE P1363.1, ANSI X9.98 [7], EESS1v2
[8] and EESS1v3 [9]. It has been projected as the leading
contender for replacing ECC and RSA [10] in the post-
quantum era because these algorithms are vulnerable to
quantum algorithm attacks, specifically Shor‘s algorithm.
In comparison to ECC and RSA, NTRU has a small foot-
print of approximately 8kB, is faster and has a smaller key
size than RSA [11]. NTRU has been improved progressively
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since its release in 1998 in terms of recommendation of
parameter sets that can withstand various attacks such as the
lattice reduction and Meet-in-the-middle(MITM) attacks and
the recommendation of parameters that increase the combi-
national search space so as to enhance security. Research
has also been conducted on variants of NTRU, in which the
polynomial ring of integers is replaced with the Eisenstein
integers [11], Gaussian ring of integers, integer matrices [12]
as well as quarternion algebra which has a non-commutative
structure thus making it more resistant to lattice-based attacks
[13]. Despite NTRU’s superior performance and security, it
has one drawback in that, there is a probability of decryption
failure which makes it impossible to recover the plain text
from a validly created cipher text.
This study seeks to answer the following questions: does
any randomly selected NTRU parameter from the range of
all possible polynomial combinations of f ,g,ϕ and m result
in successful NTRU operation in terms of key generation,
encryption and decryption and if not, which parameter(s)
is most influential and what is the criteria for selecting
this parameter(s), in addition to the published criteria, so
as to ensure successful operation. In order to answer these
questions, this study discusses an experimental study of the
most influential parameters for NTRU operation and uses
the derived nature of the NTRU parameters to propose an
extended parameter selection criteria to ensure invertibility
of a randomly selected private key and propose a correlated
criteria for parameter selection. This extended criteria will
help to further narrow down the range of acceptable param-
eters and thus reduce the number of errors occurring due to
erroneous selection of non-invertible polynomial f and also
providing a range for selection of the corresponding public
parameter q that will further ensure there is a high probability
of successful message decryption.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II we
introduce the basic structure and parameters of the NTRU
public key cryptosystem. This is followed by a description
of the previously recommended NTRU parameters in Section
III. Section IV describes the methodology used in conduction
this study along with a discussion of the test parameters used
for experimentation. This is accompanied by a discussion
of the test results obtained in the study. The Section VI
describes the analysis conducted on the private key poly-
nomial f as this was identified as a key determinant of
decryption failure. An evaluation of the relationship between
parameters is described along with the observations and con-
clusions drawn by progressive variation of parameters. Then
an extended private key selection criteria is recommended in
Section VII. Finally, a conclusion of the study is provided
in Section VIII.
II. NTRU
NTRU is based on the polynomial convolution ring R =
Z[X]
(XN−1) which implies that all computations are modulus
(XN − 1) and that there are convolution multiplications.
All polynomials in the ring have integer coefficients and a
maximum degree of (N − 1). In the ring R, addition of two
polynomials refers to the pairwise addition of coefficients of
the same degree while multiplication is referred to as con-
volution multiplication. The parameters used in the NTRU
cryptosystem are:
1) The parameter size N
2) A large modulus q
3) A small modulus p
4) Polynomial f which should be invertible modulus p
and modulus q
5) A polynomial g which does not require to be invertible
6) A blinding value ϕ
7) Plain text message expressed as the polynomial m.
The parameter selection criteria for the NTRU parameters
listed above is as described in the subsequent section as
published in [14], [15].
A. Degree parameter N
The degree parameter N is a positive integer and specifies
that the ring R consists of truncated polynomials of degree
(N − 1) with integer coefficients a = a0 + a1X + a2X2 +
a3X
3 + . . .+ aN−2XN−2 + aN−1XN−1. It determines the
maximum degree (N − 1) for the polynomials f and g.
B. Parameters p and q
q is the large modulus while p is the small modulus,
both of which should be relatively prime to each other.
The polynomials in NTRU are either of binary, ternary or
product form, depending on whether p is selected as 2, 3
or 2 + x respectively. Binary polynomials allow for a small
parameter q to be used [16]. Ternary polynomials provide a
balance between security and efficiency in that there is an
increased number of combinations and the size of q can be
kept as small as possible while ensuring a low probability of
decryption failure [14]. The use of product form polynomials
originated from the need to provide efficiency [14] given that
it eliminates the need to calculate the polynomial inverses.
The corresponding values of q are: when p = 2 then q is
selected as a prime number and when p = 3 or for p = 2+x
then q is selected as an integral power of 2 (that is 2m where
m is an integer).
C. Polynomials f and g
The small polynomials f and g are secret polynomials
which are selected by uniform sampling from a set of binary
or ternary polynomials whereby a predetermined number of
-1 , 1 and 0 coefficients have been set [16]. For binary
polynomials, the polynomial f has df of the coefficients
equal to 1 while (N − df ) coefficients are 0. For ternary
polynomials, the polynomial f has df of the coefficients
equal to 1 while (df−1) coefficients are -1 and the rest are 0
coefficients. For ternary polynomials, p = 3, the polynomial
g has dg coefficients equal to 1, dg coefficients equal to -1
and the rest of the coefficients are 0.
The slight difference between the polynomials f and g
is because f has to be invertible while g does not need to
be invertible. There is a greater probability of f having an
inverse provided that the GCD of f (1) with p and with q is
1 and the sum of the coefficients of f is 1 upon evaluation
of f(1).
D. Lf , Lg , Lm and Lϕ
Lf and Lg represent private key spaces which are given
by a set of small polynomials from which the private keys
will be selected. The polynomials f and g are randomly
generated in Lf and Lg respectively. Lm represents the plain
text space, which is given by a set of polynomials which
represent the encryptable message. Lϕ represents a set of
polynomials from which the blinding value will be selected
[15].
E. Blinding value ϕ
ϕ is a blinding value (which is temporary), used to obscure
or hide the message which is different for each transaction.
It has dϕ coefficients equal to 1, dϕ coefficients equal
to -1 and the rest of the coefficients are 0. The blinding
polynomial is generated from the padded message using the
standard polynomial convolution method or by the use of the
optimized polynomial convolution method [9].
F. Plaintext message m
The message m is expressed in the form of a polynomial
whose coefficients are modulo p so that its coefficients lie
between −p2 and
p
2 .
If a user desires a k-bit security level, then 2k bits of a
message can be transported at a time. For example, for 112-
bit security, then 224 bits of a message can be transported at
a time thus the message has to be split into 2k bits blocks.
The random padding length l should be such that l ≥ k.
The value of N is set such that it is the first prime number
that is greater than 3k [15], [17], for instance if desired
security level k is 80-bits, then N can be selected as 243.
If a message padding scheme is used, such as the SVES-3
padding scheme which utilizes 8 bits to encode the length of
the transported message, the length of N should be at least
3k+8 [18]. A smaller value of N implies that the bandwidth
utilized will be lower and operations will be faster.
G. NTRU Operation
NTRU operation begins with the establishment of the
integers N, p, q and the polynomials f, g, ϕ and m. The
public and private keys are then generated by obtaining the
multiplicative inverse of f mod p and f mod q such that:
Fq ∗ f ≡ 1(mod q) (1)
Fp ∗ f ≡ 1(mod p) (2)
The private key is given by f, Fp and the public key h is
obtained by computing:
h = pFq ∗ g(mod q) (3)
The message m is encrypted using the public key, h by
computing:
e = ϕ ∗ h+m(mod q) (4)
The ciphertext is decrypted using the private key by comput-
ing:
a ≡ f ∗ e(mod q) (5)
After which adjustment is done by ensuring that the coef-
ficients of a are in the range of q2 and
−q
2 . This is then
followed by retrieving the decrypted message by computing
C = Fp ∗ a(mod p) (6)
[21] provides a simplified implementation of NTRU in the
form of mini-NTRU. Decryption is made possible because
the polynomials p, ϕ, g and m are chosen to have small
values in the polynomial convolution ring R thus ensuring the
polynomial pϕg+fm has a high probability of having width
b (which represents pϕg+fm) less than q. In other words, the
coefficients of these terms are selected in a way that ensures
that they have an absolute value that does not exceed q2 [22].
Therefore, the proof of decryption is as follows:
Since the ciphertext is obtained by computing e ≡ ϕ∗h+
m(mod q) then
a ≡ f ∗ e(mod q) = f ∗ (ϕ ∗ h+m)mod q (7)
= (f ∗ ϕ ∗ h+ f ∗m)mod q (8)
Since h ≡ pFq ∗ g(mod q) then
a = [(f ∗ ϕ ∗ (p ∗ Fq ∗ g)) + (f ∗m)]modq (9)
Since Fq ∗ f ≡ 1(mod q) then
a = [(p ∗ ϕ ∗ g) + (f ∗m)]mod q (10)
This implies that since C = Fp ∗ a(mod p) then
C = Fp ∗ a(mod p) = p ∗ (Fp ∗ ϕ ∗ g) + Fp ∗ f ∗m (11)
= 0 + 1 ∗m = mmod p (12)
The product p∗ (Fp ∗ϕ∗g) is a small value close to zero. In
the real sense, it is observed that this product is a multiple
of p thus reduction mod p results in a zero. Thus retrieving
the value of the plain text m.
In the case where the width of (p∗ϕ∗g+f ∗m) is greater
than or equal to q, then a gap failure occurs but if the range
of of (p ∗ ϕ ∗ g + f ∗ m) is less than q but reduced into
the wrong interval, then this is referred to as a wrap failure.
A wrap failure can be adjusted by reducing a to the range
[A,A + q − 1] in which A 6= −q2 and the mod q equality
from the equation a ≡ p ∗ ϕ ∗ gmod q is an exact equality
in Z [X] (meaning that the product is not greater than q2 or
less than −q2 ) [23].
On the other hand, when a gap failure occurs, it will result
in decryption failure since the range of a is exceeded thus
resulting in the inability to correctly recover (p∗ϕ∗g+f ∗m)
. The use of the range [A.A + q − 1] serves as a partial
solution to the problem of decryption failures. This process
of increasing the chances of a correct decryption is called
re-centering [24], [25].
III. PREVIOUS RECOMMENDED PARAMETERS
Since the invention of NTRU in 1998, several parameter
sets have been recommended and revised for binary, ternary
and product-form polynomials. The Table I shows the some
of the previously recommended parameter sets for p = 2 and
p = 3, on which we base our study.
The parameter sets ees251ep4 and ees251ep5 use product
form polynomial (f = 1 + pF ) because it results in an
inverse of 1 therefore eliminating the need for calculating the
inverse [8]. ees251ep4 stands for efficient embedded security
encryption parameters with degree 251 set 4.
The parameter sets NTRU167.2, NTRU263.2 and
NTRU503.3 were recommended following the establishment
of the probability of wrap failure and gap failure in NTRU.
These parameter sets were meant to provide a balance
between security and decryption levels [20].
IV. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this study involved carrying out
tests on NTRU parameters in order to answer the following
questions: does any randomly selected NTRU parameter
from the range of all possible polynomial combinations of
f ,g,ϕ and m result in successful NTRU operation in terms of
key generation, encryption and decryption and if not, which
parameter(s) is most influential and what is the criteria for
selecting this parameter(s), in addition to the published cri-
teria, so as to ensure successful operation. This was done by
evaluating how varying any of the NTRU parameters affects
its successful key generation, encryption and subsequently
successful message decryption. This was followed by an
analysis of the test results to identify the most influential
parameters. The most influential parameters were then used
to conduct further tests to identify a selection criteria that is
bound to ensure a higher probability of successful operation
and subsequently successful message decryption.
Previous research works on NTRU do not discuss the
methodology used in deriving the recommended parameter
sets and parameter selection criteria, including publications
TABLE I: Previously Recommended NTRU parameters for p = 2 and p = 3
Parameter set Security level (k) N p q df dg dϕ Reference
ees251ep4 80 251 2 239 72 72 72 [8], [19]
ees251ep5 80 251 2 239 72 72 72
NTRU167.2 Low 167 2 127 45 35 18 [20]
NTRU263.2 Moderate 263 2 127 35 35 22
NTRU503.3 High 503 2 253 100 100 65
NTRU 167 49 167 3 128 61 20 18 [6]
ees401ep1 112 401 3 2048 113 113 113 [7]
on variants of NTRU. This study delves into a description
of the methodology used to arrive at an extended parameter
selection criteria which further narrows down the margin for
erroneous parameter selection in NTRU which will affect its
successful operation and subsequent key generation, encryp-
tion and decryption.
A. Evaluating Effect of NTRU Parameter Variation
An experimental analysis of the NTRU parameters was
done, beginning with low security levels to identify the
most influential parameters in the occurrence of decryption
failure. The results of the analysis at low security levels
were then used to obtain the proportions for estimating
sample sizes to be used for testing higher security levels.
The testing began by varying each of the parameters f , g,
ϕ and m one at a time for possible values of polynomials
for N = 11. The proportions obtained for successful key
generation, encryption and decryption from the analysis done
at low security levels (N = 11 and N = 53) were used
as input in determining appropriate sample sizes for testing
higher security levels, including the previously proposed
recommended NTRU parameters.
B. Uniform Sampling without Replacement
The sample sizes were obtained by using uniform random
sampling where the samples were selected by using a ran-
dom number generator without replacement. First, an initial
sample size n0 was obtained by computing:
n0 =
z2 × p (1− p)
e2
(13)
where z is the critical value for the confidence level c, p
is the proportion or distribution and e is the sampling error.
Since n0 is at least 5% of the population N and sampling
is without replacement, the sample size is more accurately
estimated by reducing the error in the previous computation
of n0 by applying the Finite Population Correction Factor
(FPC). This was done by computing [26]–[29]:
n =
n0 ·N
n0 + (N − 1) (14)
Uniform random sampling was used, with a 99% confi-
dence interval and 5% margin of error. The proportion, p
used is based on the results obtained from the test results for
low security levels. The uniform sampling method is used
in this study because it is the documented sampling method
used to select secret polynomials f and g [14], [16], [18]. The
method of sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution as
proposed by [30] in 2014 can also be used for selecting f
and g. However, Gaussian sampling results in a large public
key size of 378353 for N = 256, 1511821 for N = 512 for
instance, in comparison to public key q = 2048 for uniform
sampling [16]. For this reason, uniform sampling method was
used in this study as opposed to sampling from a discrete
Gaussian distribution.
C. Test Parameters
Tests were conducted for binary polynomials at N = 11,
N = 53 and N = 251 for 3-bit, 16-bit and 80-bit security
levels respectively. Testing at 32-bit security levels and
beyond took a significant amount of time on the available
processing resources owing to the sequential nature of the
task execution for the tests in this study. Therefore, the
obtained results for low security levels were used as input for
proportions used for sampling to be used for high-security
level testing. The test parameters used in this study are
as shown in the Table II. The base test parameters used
to conduct this study are appended in Appendix A. These
base test parameters were selected following the existing
parameter selection criteria.
The initial sample size tested for N = 11 was 28 out of
the 211 possible combinations for each of the polynomials f ,
g, ϕ and m. The value of parameter q was varied by testing
the range of prime numbers starting from 1 to 203. Once
proportions were obtained from the initial tests on N = 11,
the sample sizes were computed after which the sample size
of N = 11, eesTest1 was adjusted to the computed sample
size (501 combinations) and more polynomial combinations
tested as illustrated in the Table II. The proportions obtained
from the initial tests were 0.4922:0.5078 which stand for
the ratio of successful key generation to unsuccessful key
generation. The sample sizes for eesTest1, eesTest2 and
ees251ep4 were obtained by computation using the Equation
13 and Equation 14. The outcome of the tests is provided in
Section V.
D. Testing Environment and Sequence
The testing sequence for this study was conducted as
follows:
1) Input test parameters N, p, f, g, r,m for eesTest1.
2) Generate a range of prime numbers from 1 to a random
large prime, for instance 700.
3) Vary q in the test parameter set using the generated
primes in step 2.
4) Generate all possible polynomial combinations with
maximum degree N − 1 (that is 2N polynomial com-
binations).
5) Vary g by replacing it with the polynomial combina-
tions generated in step 4, one at a time, and record the
result.
6) Repeat step 5 for f , r and m.
7) In the case of non-invertible polynomial f , discard the
polynomial and move onto the next polynomial in the
sequence.
a) If f is invertible and has successful message
decryption, record the result.
b) If f is invertible but has decryption failure, repeat
steps 3 and 4 and record the result.
c) If f is invertible but still has decryption failure
after repeating steps 3 to 6, vary q by repeating
step 3 and record the result. This is done to
evaluate if the variation of parameters g, r and m
could switch the result from ‘decryption failure‘
to ‘successful decryption‘.
8) Repeat steps 1 to 7 for eesTest2, ees251ep4, NTRU167
and ees401ep1.
The results of the testing were used to identify the in-
fluential parameters which were then varied for N = 53
and the recommended parameter sets in the EESS1v2 [8]
TABLE II: Test parameters for binary and ternary NTRU polynomials
Parameter set k N p q df dg dϕ dm Population Sample size Actual
Sample
Tested
eesTest1 3 11 2 37 4 5 4 6 211 501 1000
eesTest2 16 53 2 67 7 27 40 35 253 663 1000
eesTest3 3 11 3 32 4 5 4 6 311 501 1000
eesTest4 16 53 3 64 7 27 40 35 353 663 1000
ees251ep4 [8], [19] 80 251 2 239 72 72 72 35 3251 663 1000
NTRU 167 [6] 49 167 3 128 61 20 18 70 3167 663 1000
ees401ep1 [7] 112 401 3 2048 113 113 113 70 3401 663 1000
for N = 251 for binary polynomials as well as product-form
polynomials.
The testing was carried out on a Windows 8.1 64-bit
operating system with Intel core i5 processor and 4GB
RAM computer running the Magma computational algebra
system. The Magma computational algebra system was used
following precedence of other research studies conducted in
the same environment, namely; the study conducted on speed
records for NTRU when run on a graphical processing unit
(GPU) by Hermans in 2010 [31] and in a cryptanalysis study
on a revised NTRUSign scheme conducted by Geiler and
Smart [32].
A discussion of the observations made from the test results
for binary polynomials at various security levels is provided
in the subsequent section.
V. RESULTS-IDENTIFYING THE INFLUENTIAL NTRU
PARAMETERS
The results of tests for the parameter sets with binary,
product- form and ternary coefficients are described in the
subsequent section.
A. Binary and Product-Form Polynomials
The results of varying NTRU binary and product form
parameters is depicted in Table IV. The Table III shows
the parameter being varied one at a time, in the left-most
column, while all other parameters are kept constant. This
is followed by the next three columns showing percentage
variability for test parameters sets for 3-bit, 16-bit and 80-
bit security respectively. The percentage variability stands
for the number of polynomials which showed unsuccessful
key generation. This occurs as a result of the selection of
non-invertible polynomials of f which results in the key
generation algorithm going into an infinite loop of trying
to find the inverse and when no inverse is found then no key
is generated.
TABLE III: Test Results for binary NTRU polynomials
Varying parameter Percentage VariabilityeesTest1 eesTest2 ees251ep4
q Successful for large primes of q
f 50.8982 50.3771 48.1146
product form (f =
1 + pF )
0 0 0
g 0 0 0
ϕ 0 0 0
The variation of polynomial q revealed that decryption
was successful for large values of the prime q. Prime values
greater than 29 resulted in successful decryption for eesTest1,
while prime values greater than 101 resulted in successful
decryption for eesTest2. This drew attention to the existence
of a relationship between the value of prime q and the
selected polynomial f .
The variation of polynomial g resulted in 100% successful
decryption regardless of the binary polynomial of g chosen
from the range of possible combinations of polynomials at
the corresponding security levels.The variation of polynomial
ϕ also resulted in 100% successful decryption regardless of
the random polynomial of ϕ chosen.
The variation of polynomial f resulted in 50.8982% of
the tested polynomial combinations having no multiplicative
inverse mod p and mod q thus resulting in no key being
generated and therefore no encryption and decryption for
N = 11. For N = 53, 50.3771% of the polynomial
combinations had no multiplicative inverse while 48.1146%
had no multiplicative inverse for N = 251.
It was also observed from the results that the variation
of the product form polynomial f also resulted in 100%
successful key generation, and subsequent encryption and
decryption regardless of the random polynomial of f cho-
sen. This means that choosing the product form f means
there is assurance of finding a multiplicative inverse mod p
and mod q. These results point to the significance of the
polynomial f chosen, on whether key generation is possible
and subsequently on whether encryption and decryption is
possible. This confirms the assertion that decryption failures
are predominantly key-dependent [14].
B. Ternary Polynomials
The results of varying NTRU ternary form parameters is
depicted in Table IV.
TABLE IV: Test Results for ternary NTRU polynomials
Varying parameter Percentage VariabilityeesTest3 eesTest4 NTRU
167
ees401ep1
q Successful for large powers of 2 (large q)
f 27.06 26.36 27.06 26.34
g 98.491 98.63 98.491 97.51
ϕ 97.577 97.010 98.491 97.872
For ternary polynomials, the variation of f, g, ϕ resulted
in no key being generated in 72.94%, 1.509% and 2.423% of
the instances for eesTest3. A similar general trend was also
observed in test parameters eesTest3, eesTest4, NTRU 167
and ees401ep1. The variation of q revealed that there was
(a) Graph of f(1) against q for
eesTest2
(b) Graph of f(1) against q for
ees251ep4
Fig. 1: Evaluation of the relationship between f(1) and q for NTRU binary polynomials
successful decryption for large powers of 2. The variation of
f revealed that 72.94% of the polynomials tested for 8-bit
ternary combinations have no multiplicative inverse mod p
and mod q thus resulting in no key generation.
Further examination of the invertible polynomials of f
revealed that the number of 1’s were either one more than
the number of -1 coefficients or one less than the number of
1 coefficients. This leads to the conclusion that in order to
have a ternary polynomial of f that has an inverse mod p and
mod q then the value of f(1) when the sum of coefficients
is computed should either be 1 or -1. This increases the
range of possible polynomial combinations of f , since the
previous parameter selection criteria prescribes that f should
be selected such that f(1) = 1.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN f AND q
This study revealed that some polynomials of f do not
have a multiplicative inverse. Therefore, when these polyno-
mials go through the process of finding a multiplicative in-
verse (which can be computed using the Extended Euclidean
algorithm), the process results in an infinite loop which does
not terminate and neither does it print out the inverse Fp and
Fq thus no private key is generated thus resulting in an error.
Further evaluation of the invertible polynomials shows that
f(1) when the sum of coefficients was computed, is an odd
number for all the invertible polynomials of f . In addition, it
was observed that the value of f(1) had a relationship with
the size of q. For N = 11, the polynomial combinations that
were invertible and had successful decryption had q = 37
and f(1) = 3, 5 and 7. For the higher security levels, some
of the polynomial combinations with an odd value of f(1)
did not have successful decryption (due to the size of q upon
evaluation) while others were successful for N = 53, q = 37
and N = 251, q = 239. The size of q was then varied
upwards to a larger prime till decryption was successful and
the corresponding values recorded.
In addition, it was observed that all the invertible polyno-
mials of f have GCD(f(1), p) = 1 and GCD(f(1), q) = 1.
This is in line with the recommended condition in [14] in the
determination of whether a set of values have a multiplicative
inverse such that (a ∗ b)modn ≡ 1.
A graphical representation of the relationship between
f(1) and q for eesTest2 is shown in the Figure 1a. The
test results for eesTest2 show a correlation coefficient of
0.93109468 between the values of f(1) and q and a cor-
responding equation of regression line was derived given by:
y = 72 + 4.429x (15)
The results for ees251ep4 for binary form of f show a
correlation coefficient of 0.7004 between the values of f(1)
and q and a corresponding equation of regression line was
derived given by:
y = 281.586 + 0.442x (16)
The graphical representation of this relationship is shown in
the Figure 1b.
The NTRU parameter selection criteria recommended by
[14], [15] for polynomial f ensured that there was a high
probability of the polynomial having a multiplicative inverse
therefore making it possible to generate a private key and
eventually encrypt and decrypt messages correctly. Based
on the results of this study, it has been established that the
criteria set does not conclusively cover all possibilities for
the selection of private keys that would result in successful
decryption of messages encrypted using the NTRU cryp-
tosystem.
A. Identification of the Selection Criteria for q for Elimina-
tion of Decryption Failure
The study proceeded to establish an additional selection
criteria which will provide for the selection of the mini-
mum size of q required for successful message decryption,
as opposed to just selecting an upper limit. The existing
recommended criteria on binary polynomials in [14], [22]
is that in order to avoid decryption failure, the size of q
should be large enough whereby c should be selected such
that 3c+ 1 > q2 . The value of c is given by c =
q−2
2p .
In order to establish the criteria that will ensure the
selection of the minimum size of q required for successful
decryption, an evaluation of the relationship between the
previous criteria (3c + 1 > q/2) and the actual minimum
size of q that resulted in successful message decryption
was carried out in this study. The observed results are as
illustrated in the Figure 2.
The Figure 2 points to the existence of a linear relationship
between the previously published recommended criteria and
the findings of this study for the minimum required size
of q for successful message decryption. Therefore, this is
beneficial in being able to accurately predict an exact size
of q which will result in successful decryption as opposed
to just selecting an upper limit.
Fig. 2: Comparison of the previous selection criteria for
size of q against the new recommended criteria and actual
minimum size of q for successful decryption.
Expressing the relationship between the previous criteria
q
2 = 3c+ 1 which translates to q = 6c+ 2 and the observed
sizes of q given by y = 1.3333x + 0.6667 in terms of
fractions results in
y =
4
3
x+
2
3
(17)
Replacing x with 3c+ 1 and y with q results in
q =
4
3
(3c+ 1) +
2
3
q =
12c+ 4
3
+
2
3
=
12c+ 6
3
q = 4c+ 2
q
2
= 2c+ 1
Therefore, this implies that in order to ensure successful
message decryption at varied security levels, the size of
public parameter q should be selected to be an appropriately
large value which satisfies the condition that
q = 2c+ 1 or
q
2
= 2c+ 1 (18)
for binary polynomials.
In comparison to the existing published criteria, it is the
observation of this study that the size of q required for
successful message decryption is smaller than the previously
published criteria, which gives an upper limit. A comparison
of public parameter size q selected using the previous criteria
compared to the newly recommended criteria as well as the
actual size of q that results in successful decryption is as
shown in the Figure 3.
It can be observed from the Figure 3 that the actual min-
imum size of q required for successful message decryption
matches with the predicted size of q using the new recom-
mended criteria q = 4c + 2. The predicted size of q using
the previous criteria is much larger than the actual minimum
size of q required for successful message decryption. The
recommended criteria in this study results in a 33.050%
reduction in the predicted size of q required for successful
message decryption. This study proves that selecting the size
of q such that q = 4c+2 will result in a predicted size of q
which exactly matches the actual minimum size of q required
for successful message decryption.
This study has shown that the previous criteria set an
upper limit for the size of q which would result in successful
decryption. In the next section, we outline an extended pa-
rameter selection criteria which ensures successful message
decryption.
VII. RECOMMENDED EXTENDED PARAMETER
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR THE PRIVATE KEY AND
PUBLIC PARAMETER q
The observations made in this study as described in the
previous sections and the conclusions drawn led to the
recommendation of an extended NTRU parameter selection
criteria. The emphasis of this study is on the private key
polynomial f and public parameter q (which directly affects
the public key size) since it has been proven in Section
V above, that these are the most influential parameters
for successful NTRU operation. The polynomial f shows
variability of 50.8982% in comparison to the 0% variability
of polynomials m, g and ϕ.
The recommended general parameter selection algorithm
which is a combination of previous work [14], [16], [22] and
the findings of this study is as follows: i
1) Take p = 2.
2) Set N to be the first prime greater than 3k + 1.
3) Select q to be a prime integer. Select q such that q =
2c + 1 where c = q−22p in order to ensure successful
decryption.
4) Select binary polynomials g,ϕ and m with dg , dϕ, dm
number of 1‘s respectively. The number of coefficients
dg , dϕ, dm lie in the range 1 ≤ dg, dϕ, dm ≥ N .
5) Select binary polynomial f with df number of 1‘s
where df is an odd integer so as to ensure it has a mul-
tiplicative inverse mod p and mod q. GCD(f(1), p)
and GCD(f(1), q) should be 1.
6) Select ternary polynomial f with df number of 1‘s and
df − 1 number of -1‘s (that is f(1) = 1) or df − 1
number of 1‘s and df number of -1‘s (that is f(1) =
−1) so as to ensure it has a multiplicative inverse mod
p and mod q
This extended parameter selection criteria ensures that
the chosen polynomial of f is invertible modulus p and
modulus q and that the exact size of q required for successful
Fig. 3: Comparison of the previous criteria, actual minimum
size of q for successful message decryption and the new
recommended criteria.
decryption is selected so as to ensure there is no decryption
failure. A tabular comparison of the extended parameter
selection criteria in comparison to the existing selection
criteria is depicted in Table V.
The Table VI provides a list of recommended parameter
sets which ensure no decryption failure.
These parameters are derived from experimentation con-
ducted in this study which follows the extended recom-
mended parameter selection criteria proposed in this study.
We leave to future work the evaluation of these recommended
parameter sets against practical lattice reduction attacks. This
will provide confirmation of these security levels in practical
application where the parameters are prone to attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The study shows that in order to ensure successful de-
cryption and increase the range of polynomials of private
key f which result in successful decryption, some additional
parameter selection criteria should be included. The private
key, for binary polynomials, should be selected such that in
addition to having GCD(f(1), p) = 1 and GCD(f(1), q) =
1, the number of 1‘s in f (df ) should be an odd integer which
lies in the range 1 < df ≤ N , where N is the parameter size
of the integer ring R. For ternary polynomials, the private
key polynomial f should be selected such that the number
of 1’s in f are one more than -1’s or the number of 1’s are
one less than the number of -1’s (f(1) = 1 or -1) The use
of this criteria ensures that the polynomial of f selected is
invertible modulus p and modulus q and also increases the
range of invertible polynomials of f .
In order to reduce the probability of decryption failure,
the study revealed that it is imperative that parameters f and
q are selected with consideration. This study revealed the
existence of a high correlation between the size of f(1) and
q. The value of q should be selected to be appropriately large
so as to ensure successful decryption.
This study provides a parameter selection criteria for the
value of q which ensures no decryption failure at varied
security levels. This can be achieved by selecting q such that
q
2 = 2c+1. This extended parameter selection criteria helps
to ensure no decryption failure in the NTRU cryptosystem
thus providing a greater assurance of security.
The use of this recommended parameter selection criteria
helps to accurately predict the public parameter q that ensures
successful message decryption. This eliminates the need to
select an upper limit of q, which provides efficiency in terms
of memory requirements and thus subsequently reducing
public key size. Therefore, there is memory efficiency and
provision of assurance that the selected size of q will ensure
successful message decryption.
Future work could be carried out to ascertain whether the
recommended size of q selected using the criteria recom-
mended in this study provides the same security level when
the parameters are subjected to practical lattice reduction
attacks.
APPENDIX
BASE TEST PARAMETERS
N = 11
p = 2
q = 37
f = 1 + x4 + x7 + x8 + x9 df = 5
g = 1 + x+ x4 + x6 + x10 dg = 5
m = x+ x3 + x5 + x8 + x9 + x10 dm = 6
ϕ = 1 + x3 + x4 + x8 dϕ = 4
TABLE V: Comparison of the previous and recommended extended parameter selection criteria
Coefficients previous selection criteria proposed revised criteria
Coefficients in binary f , df - odd integer
Coefficients in ternary f , df f(1)=1 f(1)=1 or -1
GCD(f(1), p) 1 1
GCD(f(1), q) 1 1
Size of q (3c+ 1) > q
2
2c+ 1 = q
2
TABLE VI: Recommended parameter sets
Parameter set Security level (k) N p q df dg dϕ dm
ees251epJ04 80 251 3 256 71 72 72 35
ees251epJ03 80 251 2 331 150 72 72 35
ees251epJ02 80 251 2 331 73 72 72 35
ees251epJ01 80 251 2 317 71 72 72 35
ees16epJ02 80 251 2 239 72 72 72 35
ees16epJ01 16 53 3 63 7 27 40 35
ees16epJ03 16 167 2 127 45 35 18 35
ees11epJ03 3 11 3 32 4 5 4 6
ees11epJ02 3 11 2 29 3 3 5 6
ees11epJ01 3 11 2 17 5 4 4 6
N = 53
p = 2
q = 67
f = x39 + x38 + x37 + x36 + x35 + x34 + x33
+x32 + x31 + x30 + x29 + x28 + x27 + x26 + x25
+x24 + x13 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x9 + x8 + x7
+x6 + x5 + x4 + x
df = 27
g = x29 + x28 + x27 + x26 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21
+x20 + x19 + x18 + x17 + x16 + x15 + x14 + x13 + x12
+x11 + x10 + x9 + x8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x
dg = 27
m = x37 + x36 + x35 + x34 + x33 + x32 + x31 + x30 + x29
+x28 + x27 + x26 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20+
x19 + x18 + x17 + x16 + x15 + x14 + x13 + x12 + x11+
x10 + x9 + x8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x
dm = 35
ϕ = x42 + x41 + x40 + x39 + x38 + x37 + x36 + x35
+x34 + x33 + x32 + x31 + x30 + x29 + x28 + x27 + x26
+x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20 + x19 + x18 + x17
+x16 + x15 + x14 + x13 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x9 + x8
+x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x
dϕ = 40
N = 251
p = 2
q = 239
f = x71 + x70 + x69 + x68 + x67 + x66 + x65 + x64
+x63 + x62 + x61 + x60 + x59 + x58 + x57 + x56 + x55
+x54 + x53 + x52 + x51 + x50 + x49 + x48 + x47 + x46
+x45 + x44 + x43 + x42 + x41 + x40 + x39 + x38 + x37
+x36 + x35 + x34 + x33 + x32 + x31 + x30 + x29 + x28
+x27 + x26 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20 + x19
+x18 + x17 + x16 + x15 + x14 + x13 + x12 + x11 + x10
+x9 + x8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1
df = 73
g = x71 + x70 + x69 + x68 + x67 + x66 + x65 + x64
+x63 + x62 + x61 + x60 + x59 + x58 + x57 + x56 + x55
+x54 + x53 + x52 + x51 + x50 + x49 + x48 + x47 + x46
+x45 + x44 + x43 + x42 + x41 + x40 + x39 + x38 + x37
+x36 + x35 + x34 + x33 + x32 + x31 + x30 + x29 + x28
+x27 + x26 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20 + x19
+x18 + x17 + x16 + x15 + x14 + x13 + x12 + x11 + x10
+x9 + x8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1
dg = 72
m = x37 + x36 + x35 + x34 + x33 + x32 + x31 + x30
+x29 + x28 + x27 + x26 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21
+x20 + x19 + x18 + x17 + x16 + x15 + x14 + x13 + x12
+x11 + x10 + x9 + x8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x
dm = 35
ϕ = x139 + x138 + x137 + x136 + x135 + x134 + x133
+x132 + x131 + x130 + x129 + x128 + x127 + x126 + x125
+x124 + x123 + x122 + x121 + x120 + x119 + x118 + x117
+x116 + x115 + x114 + x113 + x112 + x111 + x110 + x109
+x108 + x107 + x106 + x105 + x104 + x103 + x102 + x101
+x100 + x99 + x98 + x97 + x96 + x95 + x94 + x93 + x92
+x91 + x90 + x89 + x88 + x87 + x86 + x85 + x84 + x83
+x82 + x81 + x80 + x79 + x78 + x77 + x76 + x75 + x74
+x73 + x72 + x71 + x70 + x69 + x67
dϕ = 72
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